As the aggression against Gaza continued, last March, the Israeli Air Force conducted a training maneuver in the airspace of Cyprus simulating an air attack on Iran. Tel Aviv also agreed to launch a maritime shipping line from the port of Larnaca in Cyprus to Gaza to transport aid.
It seems that Greece and Israel are still maintaining their relationship, which has not been affected by the massacres occurring in Gaza, unlike what happened with Poland and Spain, which are talking about their soon recognition of an independent Palestinian state.
In Central Asia, since the beginning of the war, the Azerbaijani regime has been content with only superficial condemnation, says foreign policy specialist Eldar Mammadov, while oil from Azerbaijan continues to flow to Israel, and in return Baku receives advanced weapons worth billions of dollars.
This brings to the fore Israel’s relationship with Cyprus, Greece, and Azerbaijan, which falls within the “Israeli Ocean” doctrine in its new version.
Relations between Baku and Tel Aviv have strengthened in recent years against the backdrop of allegations of the threat posed by Iran (Anatolia – Archive)
Ancient Ocean Doctrine
With the establishment of the Israeli occupation state in 1948, it was dominated by concerns related to the absence of strategic depth and the limited manpower. Its theorists, led by Ben Gurion, drew up a strategy that ensured Israel’s superiority over its neighbors by building a superior military force, relying on the support of major Western countries, and adopting a foreign policy that considers To neighboring Arab countries such as Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq as sources of existential threat.
Tel Aviv considered that confronting the threat, represented by a unified Arab front, required establishing relations with non-Arab countries in the regional periphery to overcome isolation. This approach became known as the “periphery doctrine” and remained at the forefront of the Israeli diplomatic agenda from the 1950s to the 1970s.
At the forefront of the countries targeted by this doctrine were Turkey, Ethiopia, and Iran, as well as some religious and ethnic minorities such as the Kurds in northern Iraq, and the Maronites in Lebanon. But because these supposed partners sought to maintain stable relations with Arab countries, building Israel’s relations with them relied on secret diplomacy and focused on the military and intelligence spheres.
According to researcher Jean Samaan in his book “The Ocean Doctrine in Israeli Foreign Policy,” Baruch Ozil was the first to formulate the “Ocean” doctrine in his book “The Ocean Alliance: A Proposed Policy for Israel,” published in 1959, in which he points out that Tel Aviv has employed the American containment policy. The Soviet Union at the time began building secret relations with Ethiopia, Iran, and Turkey, under the pretext of confronting communist expansion in the Middle East.
Ozil believes that without military and intelligence cooperation with Ankara, Tehran, and Addis Ababa, Israel will become isolated before Egyptian influence in the era of Arab nationalism adopted by President Gamal Abdel Nasser, which represented a threat to the interests of the aforementioned capitals.
Turkish Ambassador to Israel Seyfullah Esen (center) with President Weizman (left) and Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett in 1950 (communication sites)
Therefore, Israel sold advanced weapons to the three countries, and even contributed to training their armies and security services, and also provided them with open channels of communication with Washington, which is what Gabriel Schaefer and Oren Barak discussed in their book “Israeli Security Networks.”
Relying on declassified Israeli Foreign Ministry documents, Semaan reveals that Israel supported Turkey in the Cyprus crisis in exchange for Abdel Nasser’s support for the Greek Cypriot separatists with weapons. Ankara and Tel Aviv also saw the unity of Egypt and Syria (1958-1961) as a common threat to them, as the Egyptian army was present. Equipped and trained by the Soviets on their borders.
This was accompanied by Abdel Karim Qasim’s coup in Iraq in 1958, which increased fears of Iraq’s entry into Egyptian-Soviet influence.
Abdul Karim Qasim’s coup increased Israel’s fears of Iraq coming under Egyptian-Soviet influence (social networking sites)
According to Michael Peshko, in his study that he published entitled “Israel and Ethiopia: From a Special Relationship to a Practical Relationship,” Israel exploited Ethiopia’s Christian-majority fears about its Muslim neighbors, and its anxiety about Abdel Nasser’s influence in Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti, and made Addis Ababa a base for business. Israeli secrecy on the African continent, especially collecting information about Bab al-Mandab and Egyptian activities in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.
Former Mossad officer Yossi Alpher confirms in his book “The Ocean: Israel’s Search for Allies in the Middle East” that the Mossad regularly transmitted to the Iranians intelligence reports about Egypt’s activities in the Arab countries and developments in Iraq, and contributed with Tehran to supporting the Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq against Baghdad. .
Mossad and SAVAK also cooperated in the Yemeni file by supporting the royal forces with ammunition against Egypt, which supports the Republicans. In return, Tel Aviv obtained oil from Iran via the Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline, which allowed it to avoid passing through the Suez Canal.
According to Kirsten Schulz in his book “Israel’s Secret Diplomacy in Lebanon,” Tel Aviv worked to build secret relations with the Maronite Phalange Party in Lebanon, by claiming the existence of a common threat represented by the presence of a Sunni Arab majority that threatens the self-identity of each of them.
This increased with the transfer of the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization from Jordan to Lebanon after the events of Black September in 1970, and the Maronite fear of changing the demographic structure of Lebanon. The relationship reached its peak following the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the coronation of Bashir Gemayel as president of the country.
But the assassination of Gemayel, the Phalange’s involvement in the Sabra and Shatila massacres, and the Israeli withdrawal from Beirut made Tel Aviv review its relationship with the Phalange Party, seeing it as “a militia dragging Israel into harmful sectarian wars.”
The Phalange’s involvement in the Sabra and Shatila massacres and the Israeli withdrawal from Beirut made Tel Aviv review its relationship with the party (French)
The Israeli perimeter doctrine declined following unexpected developments, which began with the death of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974, his successor’s move toward Moscow, and then the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in a massive popular revolution in 1979.
This was followed by the deterioration of relations with Turkey during the era of the Justice and Development Party, and the peace agreement with Egypt in 1979, and then with Jordan in 1994, contributed to removing neighboring Arab countries from the map of priority threats from the Israeli perspective.
The new version of the ocean doctrine
Israel’s security environment changed in the first decade of the 20th century following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime with the invasion of Iraq in 2003, then Syria entered a tunnel of internal fighting following the outbreak of the revolution in 2011, and other challenges emerged from the two former allies, Iran and Turkey.
Iran has turned into an existential threat to Israel due to its nuclear project, in addition to its support for Palestinian resistance factions, especially Hamas after it took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, as well as its relationship with the Lebanese Hezbollah.
Relations with Turkey also suffered a setback following the incident of storming the Mavi Marmara ship, which led to the killing of 10 Turkish citizens at the hands of the Israeli army during their attempt to lift the blockade of Gaza by sea.
To balance the new threats, according to Semaan, the ocean doctrine has emerged again, searching for new alliances, and here it is the turn of Azerbaijan to confront the Iranian threat, and Greece and Cyprus to confront Turkey’s challenge.
While Greece and Cyprus were friends with Egypt, there was Turkish-Israeli friendship, but Athens launched full diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv by 1990, following the expansion of normalization between Arab countries and Israel, and they signed a military cooperation agreement in 2009.
As Turkish-Israeli relations deteriorated, Israeli-Greek relations expanded to include security cooperation, tourism, and joint projects to explore and export natural gas.
In 2011, a joint ministerial council was established to strengthen various cooperation programs, and then Cyprus joined the two sides to establish a tripartite cooperation mechanism. Israeli Energy Minister Uzi Landau stated in 2012, saying, “In the Middle East, which is currently experiencing a massive earthquake extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf, The Greece-Cyprus-Israel axis will provide a critical anchor for stability.”
Semaan points out that Israel recognized Azerbaijan in 1992 following its independence from the Soviet Union, and helped it develop its armed forces, provided it with drones and missile systems, and developed its fighter planes and tanks inherited from the Soviet era, which later contributed to its recovery of the Karabakh region.
Israel also worked, through the American-Israeli Political Action Committee (AIPAC), to mediate between Baku and Washington in the face of the Armenian lobby in the United States. In return, Tel Aviv won an ally adjacent to Iranian territory, and obtained from Baku 40% of Israel’s oil consumption.
Compression papers
By returning to the perimeter doctrine again, Israel seeks to dispel its fears of isolation and its desire to possess pressure cards towards countries that it sees as a threat, but the new version is weaker than the old version, as Greece lacks the military power or political influence that Turkey possesses in the Middle East, and it also suffers. Athens suffers from recurring financial crises.
As for Azerbaijan, it provides access to the South Caucasus and the borders of Iran, but it does not offer an alternative to an ally like the Shah’s Iran, as it is a small country that is difficult to achieve a balance in the face of Tehran.
The perimeter doctrine has transformed from being an alliance aimed at balancing the threat of Arab nationalism during the Nasserist era, to become, after the peace agreement with Egypt and Jordan, and Iraq and Syria plunging into internal crises, into a hedging strategy that searches for new allies without being bound by specific geographical borders, and aims to overcome the feeling of Aviv is isolated.
Here the danger of the Abraham Accords emerges, which work to integrate Israel into its Arab environment while completely ignoring the Palestinian issue.
