Ukraine & Russia: War Fuels Dramatic Drop in Birth Rates & Fears for Future

Four years of war in Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, in Russia are reshaping the demographic landscape of both countries, with declining birth rates posing long-term challenges to their economies and societies. The conflict is not only causing immediate human suffering but is also discouraging women from starting or expanding their families, a trend with potentially far-reaching consequences.

Ukraine’s fertility rate – the average number of births per woman – has plummeted since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. From a rate of 1.22 in 2021, it fell to 1.00 in 2025, according to United Nations population data. First Lady Olena Zelenska warned in December that the rate had fallen even further, to between 0.8 and 0.9 children per woman, attributing the “critical decline” to the war and resulting insecurity. A fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman is generally considered necessary for a population to replace itself without relying on migration.

Russia has also experienced a longer-term decline in its fertility rate, exacerbated by the war. While it stood at 1.51 in 2021, it dropped to 1.37 children per woman in 2025, down from 1.4 the previous year.

The decline in birth rates is not unique to Ukraine and Russia; many European and Asian countries are facing similar trends, often linked to career choices, lifestyle factors, and economic constraints. However, four years of war appear to be significantly impacting women’s decisions to have children in Ukraine, while in Russia, women have shown resistance to repeated Kremlin calls for larger families.

Declining birth rates present significant problems for both countries, with potential knock-on effects on their economies and societies. Fewer births translate to a smaller future workforce, potentially leading to lower productivity and economic growth. This, in turn, could result in reduced tax revenues for governments and increased strain on pension and healthcare systems as aging populations grow and become more dependent on a shrinking working population.

Iryna Ippolitova, a senior researcher at the Kyiv-based Centre for Economic Strategy, explained that the decline was already underway before the war but was significantly worsened by the invasion. “Of course, in 2022 it got even worse because of this massive migration and because the majority of those who left Ukraine were people of working age, economically active people,” she said. “A lot of women who theoretically could have children left, and for those who stayed, the war and uncertainty meant they were unprepared to give birth in Ukraine, and the number of births is still declining.”

Even if a peace agreement is reached, Ippolitova believes that migration from Ukraine could continue, and those who remain may be hesitant to start families if they fear a renewed Russian invasion. She emphasized the need for security guarantees as part of any peace deal to address these concerns.

While predicting fertility trends is notoriously difficult, Ippolitova cautioned that Ukraine’s low fertility rate could pose a significant challenge to its economy in the future. Schools and universities are already experiencing declining enrollment numbers, signaling a smaller working-age population in the years to come. “I think that it is a huge problem. We have labor shortages right now, already, and after the war, it will only get worse… In 10 or 15 years when people my age retire, there will be nobody to replace them on the labor market,” she said.

In Russia, the Kremlin has attempted to address the declining birth rate through a series of incentives, promoting larger families as a “traditional Russian value” and a patriotic duty. These incentives include lump-sum payments, tax breaks, and state benefits. The revival of the Soviet-era “Mother Heroine” award, offering a cash reward of 1 million rubles (approximately $13,000) to women with 10 or more children, is another example of these efforts. However, these measures have had limited success, with Russia recording 1.222 million births in 2024 – the lowest annual total since 1999.

During his year-end press conference in December, President Vladimir Putin acknowledged a slight decline in the fertility rate, stating it stood at 1.4 in 2025 (though official figures show 1.374) and called for a “baby boom,” suggesting that Russia needed to achieve a rate of 2.0. He urged the public to view motherhood and fatherhood as “fashionable.”

However, critics argue that Putin’s focus on increasing birth rates is driven by a desire for societal control rather than genuine demographic concerns. Konstantin Sonin, a professor at the University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy, suggested that the Kremlin’s efforts are aimed at keeping women at home and focused on childcare, rather than engaging in political activity. He argued that Putin’s actions, including the war in Ukraine, have undermined economic stability, created labor market shortages, and fueled inflation, making it less likely that women will feel safe and secure enough to start families.

Sonin believes that the low birth rate is a clear indication of this lack of security and a rejection of the positive image of Russia promoted by state-run media. “There are more important things for any woman, for any young family, than just how much money in a direct cash transfer they will receive from the state. What matters for them is the general feeling of safety. And this is not there in Russia,” he said. “The quality of life has fallen since the beginning of the war. Hundreds of thousands of young people are dead because of the war, so people suddenly feel much less safe than they felt in other circumstances.”