-American-Centered Interdependence in Transition

Dependency theory has long focused on the structural subordination of the global South to the industrialized⁤ North. Far less attention,though,has been paid to relations of dependency within the ⁤advanced capitalist world itself. Ali ‍A. Mazrui was one of the few thinkers to identify and theorize this neglected dimension. Mazrui (1981, 329) argued that the post-Second World War international⁣ order was characterized not only by North-South dependency but‍ also by a similarly ⁤hierarchical form of dependency operating inside⁢ the Global North itself – one centered on ⁣the United States. He called the latter macrodependency.

mazrui’s intervention challenged a ⁣liberal framework ⁣in International Relations (IR) that was later to become influential:‍ the theory of complex interdependence⁣ associated with Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (1977). While Keohane and Nye emphasized‍ mutual dependence and reciprocal vulnerability among advanced industrial states, mazrui insisted⁢ and‍ highlighted that this interdependence was deeply asymmetrical. In his view,‍ postwar interdependence was ‍structured ⁤around american dominance in which allies were integrated into U.S.-led institutions that constrained their autonomy while reinforcing U.S. primacy.According to Mazrui (1976; 1981), macrodependency in the postwar international order assumed three principal and mutually reinforcing forms. Together,these forms ⁢structured a distinctive hierarchy within the Global North – one that differed from classical ⁢imperial domination,yet nonetheless produced durable patterns of dependence.

The⁤ first form⁣ was economic, institutionalized most clearly through the Marshall Plan beginning in 1948. The European Recovery Program is often celebrated as⁢ a⁤ benevolent act of American generosity that enabled western Europe’s rapid ⁢reconstruction after the devastation of⁤ the⁢ Second World war. Mazrui did not deny the reality or‍ meaning of European recovery. ⁤In⁣ contrast, he acknowledged that the Marshall Plan succeeded in stabilizing currencies,⁢ rebuilding ⁤industrial capacity, and preventing political⁤ collapse. Yet, he emphasized that recovery came⁢ at‍ a structural cost. Western Europe was reinserted into ⁤the⁣ global economy through institutions and rules ⁤overwhelmingly shaped ‍by the United States. Dollar hegemony, U.S. ‍leadership in⁢ the Bretton Woods institutions, and American influence over trade liberalization embedded European economies⁢ within a U.S.-centered financial and monetary architecture. Economic revival thus‍ coincided with a reconfiguration of dependence, not its elimination.

The second form of macrodependency was military, consolidated through the creation⁤ of NATO in 1949. ⁢Formally, NATO was a collective defense alliance among sovereign equals. Substantively, however, it institutionalized ‍American strategic leadership over Western‍ Europe. Security guarantees were indispensable,notably ⁤in the context of Soviet power⁣ – ⁣but they came with limits on European strategic autonomy.‍ Key decisions regarding nuclear deterrence, force posture, and alliance priorities rested largely with Washington. NATO exemplified how ⁣dependence could be normalized and legitimized through multilateral institutions. Military protection reduced vulnerability to external threats, but simultaneously entrenched reliance on⁤ U.S. leadership and constrained the emergence of autonomous European security doctrines.

The third form was technological ⁤and strategic,most clearly embodied in the US-Japan relationship following⁤ the 1951 ⁣San Francisco Peace Treaty. Japan’s postwar settlement integrated it firmly into an American-led ⁤security system. Under the U.S. nuclear⁢ umbrella, Japan was able to concentrate on economic ⁤growth and technological development while sharply limiting its military capabilities. Mazrui⁤ interpreted this arrangement ⁣as a particularly revealing case of macrodependency: Japan ⁣gained⁢ security and access ⁤to advanced ⁢technology, but only ⁢by accepting long-term restrictions on‍ strategic autonomy. Japan’s economic⁤ dynamism and its military dependence on the US thus advanced together. Japan’s extraordinary rise ⁤did not⁢ contradict‍ dependency‍ theory. ⁢It instead illustrated a variant of dependency operating among advanced industrial states.

Taken together,⁢ these economic, military, and technological arrangements produced a⁤ hierarchical order within the Global North. Western Europe and Japan were neither colonies nor peripheral economies. Yet neither were ⁢they fully ⁢autonomous grate powers. They occupied an intermediate position: structurally dependent partners embedded‍ within a system managed, stabilized, and ultimately underwritten by the United States.This configuration fundamentally contradicts liberal narratives of postwar international politics that emphasized harmony, ⁤mutual benefit, and equality among advanced capitalist states. It was precisely this contradiction that led Mazrui to question the p

style, diplomatic missteps, or short-term policy⁤ divergence. They stem from the long-term consequences of a hierarchical order whose asymmetries were sustainable only so long as the U.S. role remained mutually acceptable.

Robert Keohane and ⁤Joseph Nye (2025, 70) wrote:

…the decline underway⁤ may not be a mere temporary dip; it may be a plunge into⁣ murky waters. In his ‍erratic and misguided effort⁣ to make the united States even more powerful, Trump may bring its period of dominance—what the American publisher⁤ Henry Luce first ⁣called “the ‍American century”—to an unceremonious end.

Keohane‍ and ⁣Nye may be right. Indeed, the disruption associated with the Trump presidency ⁣should not be understood merely as an episode of nationalist‍ populism ⁣or diplomatic ⁣eccentricity. It‍ represents a late-stage⁢ rupture in an American-centered system‍ of macrodependency based on asymmetry and structural imbalance. For decades, U.S. hegemony rested not ⁢simply on power, but on consent institutionalized through economic assistance, military⁣ protection, and technological ⁢leadership.‍ But this arrangement was⁣ hierarchical interdependence rather⁣ than genuine ⁣reciprocity.what Trump did — ⁤often seemingly haphazardly — was to strip this⁤ hierarchy of its ⁤legitimating⁣ language. By demanding that ⁤allies pay more, trade less freely, and assume greater strategic autonomy, the Trump administration accelerated‍ the erosion of the very dependencies⁢ that had sustained U.S. leadership.

the signal indicates a transition toward a more fragmented and less centralized global order, one ⁢in which ⁣power ⁤is increasingly negotiated, an order akin to what Amitav Acharya (2025, ⁣22) has called the “global multiplex.” In “global multiplex,” Acharya (2025, 348) noted “… new forms of interdependence and interactions will⁣ shape world order.”

References

Acharya, Amitav. 2025. the Once⁤ and Future World Order: Why Global Civilization Will Survive the Decline of the West. London: Basic books.

Keohane, Robert ‍O.,⁣ and Joseph S. Nye Jr. 1977. Power and Interdependence: World Politics ⁤in⁣ Transition. Boston: Little, Brown.

Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye Jr. 2025. “The End of the ⁣Long American Century: Trump‍ and the Sources of U.S.⁣ Power.” Foreign Affairs, July/august: 68–79.

Mazrui, Ali A. ⁤1975. “The New Interdependence: From Hierarchy to Symmetry.” In The U.S. and World Development: Agenda for Action 1975, edited by James Howe, New York, Washington, London: Praeger Publishers.

Mazrui, ⁤Ali A. ⁤1980. “Technology, International Stratification, and the Politics of Growth.” International Political Science Review 1 ⁢(1): 68–79.

Mazrui, Ali A. 1981. “Micro-Dependency: The cuban factor in Southern ⁤Africa.” India Quarterly 37 (3): 329–345.Sanger, David E. 2025. “Power, Money and ⁣Territory.” New York Times, March 13, A5.

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