Boric Names Kevin Cowan as Central Bank Director
- President Gabriel Boric has proposed economist Kevin Cowan to succeed Stephany Griffith-Jones as an advisor to the central Bank of Chile.
- On December 9, 2025, the Ministry of Finance announced President Gabriel Boric's nomination of Kevin Cowan as the new advisor to the Central Bank of Chile.
- Cowan expressed his gratitude,stating,"I would like to thank the President of the Republic and the Minister of Finance,Nicolás Grau,for the trust placed in me for this appointment."
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kevin Cowan Nominated as Advisor to the Central Bank of chile
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President Gabriel Boric has proposed economist Kevin Cowan to succeed Stephany Griffith-Jones as an advisor to the central Bank of Chile. The appointment comes as Griffith-Jones’ term is set to conclude on December 24, 2025.
Appointment Details
On December 9, 2025, the Ministry of Finance announced President Gabriel Boric’s nomination of Kevin Cowan as the new advisor to the Central Bank of Chile. This appointment fills the position vacated by Stephany Griffith-Jones, whose term concludes on December 24, 2025.
Cowan expressed his gratitude,stating,”I would like to thank the President of the Republic and the Minister of Finance,Nicolás Grau,for the trust placed in me for this appointment.”
Stephany Griffith-Jones’ Departure
Stephany Griffith-Jones, currently serving as both advisor and vice president of the Central Bank, will conclude her term on Christmas Eve, December 24, 2025.Her departure marks the end of a meaningful period of service to the institution.
Background on the Central Bank Advisor Role
The role of advisor to the Central Bank of Chile is a crucial one,providing expert economic counsel to the board and contributing to the formulation of monetary policy. Advisors typically possess extensive experience in economics, finance, and public policy. The Central Bank’s primary objective is to maintain the stability of the Chilean peso and control inflation.
The Banco Central de Chile operates under a framework of autonomy, as established by the Political Constitution of the Republic and the Organic constitutional Law of the Central Bank of Chile. This autonomy is designed to insulate monetary policy decisions from short-term political pressures.