New START Expiration: US Nuclear Strategy, Trump’s Vision & Future Arms Control

The expiration of the New START treaty between the United States and Russia last Thursday has removed the last formal constraint on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals, prompting a reassessment of strategic posture and a renewed push for broader arms control negotiations that include China. While the treaty’s end doesn’t signal an immediate escalation, it introduces a period of heightened uncertainty and raises the prospect of a renewed arms race, according to experts.

Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Thomas DiNanno, speaking at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva Friday, outlined the U.S. Response, stating that the expiration allows for the completion of ongoing nuclear modernization programs and the potential utilization of non-deployed nuclear capacity – approximately 1,900 stored warheads – should the President direct it. He indicated potential actions including expanding current forces, diversifying capabilities, developing new theater-range nuclear forces, and adapting extended deterrence posture.

President Trump, in a post on Truth Social, proposed a different path, advocating for a “new, improved, and modernized Treaty” rather than an extension of New START, which he characterized as “badly negotiated” and “grossly violated.” This sentiment underscores a desire for a more comprehensive agreement, one that addresses perceived shortcomings of the previous framework.

The central challenge to any new agreement lies in securing the participation of China, which has consistently refused to discuss its nuclear programs in a trilateral negotiation with the U.S. And Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin has countered the U.S. Proposal by suggesting the inclusion of the United Kingdom and France, both also nuclear powers, should China join the talks.

Rose Gottemoeller, the lead U.S. Negotiator for New START and currently a Lecturer at Stanford University and Research Fellow at the Hoover Institute, offered a potential way forward at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing last Tuesday. She argued against a single trilateral negotiation, advocating instead for parallel discussions with Russia and China. “We have 50 plus years of experience limiting and reducing nuclear weapons with the Russians,” Gottemoeller stated, suggesting a continuation of that established process, including consideration of tactical and hypersonic nuclear weapons. She also emphasized the importance of including all warheads in any future agreement, a point previously raised by the Trump administration during its first term.

Gottemoeller acknowledged that New START did not address non-strategic nuclear weapons, stating that criticizing the treaty for this omission was “a bit bizarre” given its specific design. However, she reiterated support for an “all-warhead limit” in future negotiations.

Regarding China, Gottemoeller expressed optimism about the possibility of initiating a dialogue, noting recent indications of Chinese interest in exploring risk reduction measures and establishing better communication channels with the U.S. At the strategic level. She believes that fostering transparency regarding China’s nuclear modernization program is a crucial first step towards potential negotiations.

Retired-Adm. Charles A. Richard, former commander of the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and incoming chief executive officer of the Institute for Defense Analysis, echoed Gottemoeller’s sentiment, endorsing the idea of beginning a conversation with China focused on confidence-building measures and transparency. He emphasized the universal benefit of responsible operation of weapons systems with such destructive potential.

The Gottemoeller/Richard approach draws parallels to discussions from the early 1970s during the SALT I negotiations, where U.S. Negotiators found it necessary to educate Soviet diplomats, who lacked expertise in nuclear weapons, about the devastating consequences of their use to facilitate meaningful progress.

DiNanno, in his Geneva speech, highlighted concerns about Russia’s development of novel nuclear systems, specifically the nuclear-powered Skyfall cruise missile and the Poseidon strategic torpedo, neither of which were constrained by New START. He also raised questions about potential violations of testing moratoria by both Russia and China.

DiNanno revealed that the U.S. Government is aware of Chinese nuclear explosive tests, including one conducted on June 22, 2020, utilizing decoupling techniques to conceal the activity from international monitoring systems. He also stated Russia has conducted supercritical nuclear weapons tests, failing to maintain its testing moratorium.

However, Senator Jacky Rosen (D-Nev.) highlighted ongoing U.S. Efforts to maintain stockpile reliability through sub-critical experiments and advanced computer modeling at the Nevada National Security Sites, suggesting these methods provide sufficient data to assess the effectiveness of the U.S. Nuclear arsenal without resorting to explosive testing, despite calls from some for the U.S. To break its 1992 moratorium.

Both Gottemoeller and Richard agreed on the need for the U.S. To increase its nuclear forces in response to the emergence of Russia and China as potential peer nuclear powers. Gottemoeller stressed the importance of making “judicious choices” within the context of broader defense budget demands, while Richard advocated for immediate steps such as uploading warheads to intercontinental ballistic missiles and removing covers from launch tubes on Trident submarines.

Gottemoeller concluded by emphasizing the importance of predictability in maintaining stable deterrence, arguing that arms control agreements bolster predictability and support reliable, effective deterrence. Richard similarly underscored the role of deterrence in preventing escalation to nuclear conflict or broader great power war.

The situation underscores the fundamental purpose of the initial development of nuclear weapons: as terror weapons intended to end wars, not to fight them. Despite the vast number of nuclear weapons currently in existence, none have been used in a war since 1945, and they did contribute to ending World War II.