In late December 2025, forces backed by the United Arab Emirates swept across six governorates in southern Yemen and seized oil-rich provinces along Saudi ArabiaS border. Within days, Saudi airstrikes and Saudi-backed troops erased their gains. The Emirati-backed Southern Transitional Council’s territory in Yemen was reduced to practically nothing. It then quietly declared its dissolution.
this drama marked the first direct military confrontation between forces backed by the two Gulf states whose cooperation has shaped the regional security architecture for over a decade. It signifies not merely a tactical disagreement between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on an isolated issue, but an unfolding strategic divergence with possible far-reaching consequences. An understanding of this divergence is imperative for U.S. and European policymakers as the Gulf remains vital to global energy markets, maritime corridors, and multilateral security frameworks.
De-Escalatory developmentalism Versus Pre-emptive Activism
At its core, the Saudi-Emirati divergence reflects opposing views on regional stability, specifically whether the greater risk lies in intervention or restraint. Saudi “de-escalatory developmentalism” treats state collapse as the primary danger, emphasizing conflict reduction and border insulation to protect domestic transformation. By contrast, Emirati “pre-emptive activism” views the greater risk as allowing fragile arrangements to deteriorate unchecked, prioritizing external intervention to reshape a brittle order.
Saudi’s approach reflects a “de-escalation paradigm and homeland” logic. As a relatively large continental state with considerable absorptive capacity, the Kingdom views the region as basically manageable, preferring de-escalation where problems arise, and insulating itself from cross-border spillover. Riyadh is not looking to transform the region – it is looking to transform itself through ambitous strategic plans like “Saudi Vision 2030.” Riyadh avoids external interventions that could drain resources from domestic priorities, or trigger regional knock-on effects.
Underlying this caution is a Saudi conviction: “Imperfect states are not the problem – the problem is state collapse.” A weak government can be reformed, but a failed state becomes a vacuum for militias and extremists, creating cascading consequences like refugees and terrorism. Saudi Arabia’s objective is thus to protect the legitimacy of existing states (even weak ones) and preserve internationally recognized borders as the least-bad foundation for regional order. This logic manifested in Riyadh’s evolving approach to Yemen, ultimately shifting toward border security and containing Houthi influence while simultaneously refocusing on domestic advancement.
Conversely, the Emirati understanding of the region operates from a logic of pre-emptive activism – viewing the regional order not as simply imperfect, but as a brittle arrangement that could deteriorate if left unaddressed. From this perspective, Iran and its regional allies represent actively corrosive forces undermining an already fragile situation. Whereas a more powerful state like Saudi Arabia could probably tole
would ultimately produce worse outcomes, including renewed chaos, expanded Islamist influence, or Houthi gains. Early intervention thus contributed to the Council’s decision to act in December 2025.
Riyadh had opted to de-escalate in Yemen with the Houthis, and that shift led many observers to mistakenly assume that Riyadh was increasingly reluctant to use military force in Yemen. riyadh’s swift response against the Southern Transitional Council’s territorial seizure therefore came as a surprise to the council and its allies. Yet, the Kingdom’s response was wholly consistent with its strategic framework. Riyadh viewed the separatist advance in southern Yemen – particularly the seizure of Hadramout and al-Mahra along Saudi Arabia’s border – as a direct threat to Saudi national security. Allowing the advance to proceed unchecked would have weakened the internationally recognized Yemeni government. It would also have given the Houthis space to exploit divisions between government forces and the Southern Transitional Council while diminishing Saudi influence in a theater Riyadh considers vital. Taken against that set of assumptions,Riyadh’s forceful response becomes more understandable,if debateable.
But there is an added dimension to this particular episode, as riyadh is convinced that the Southern Transitional Council did not act on its own. Rather, Riyadh believes Abu Dhabi authorized the Council’s moves. Saudi Arabia interpreted this as the United Arab Emirates prioritizing the southern Transitional Council over its relationship with Riyadh – in other words, an act of hostility. Moreover, the possibility of southern Yemen’s independence represents the kind of uncontrolled risk that Saudi Arabia’s regional strategy is designed to prevent.
As such, from Riyadh’s perspective, the Council’s advances did not simply prompt Riyadh’s decision to use military force in Yemen, but were an example of open Emirati challenge to what Riyadh perceives as its rightful leadership role in the region. Indeed, Saudi Arabia now sees itself as stewarding a regional consensus on Yemen.
Ripples Across the Gulf
the growing Saudi-Emirati rift has significant implications for Gulf Cooperation Council political cohesion, particularly because it exposes disagreements over leadership, threat perceptions, and acceptable limits of unilateral action. From Riyadh’s perspective, security challenges exacerbated or enabled by a fellow Gulf Cooperation Council member represent a qualitatively different problem than external threats, especially when such tension diverts collective attention away from what Saudi Arabia continues to frame as a shared priority of containing Iran.
These concerns are inseparable from questions of regional leadership and legitimacy.Saudi Arabia’s position within the Gulf Cooperation Council and the wider gulf has long rested on a (contested) understanding of Riyadh as “first among equals,” reinforced by both military and economic power and the symbolic authority of the Saudi king as khādim al-ḥaramayn (servant of the two holy places of Mecca and Medina). Under Kin
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