Almost a year after Russia’s war with Ukraine began, the scenario for whether the war will continue to develop or end is increasingly unclear, and is expected to continue and could rage this spring, especially when that fighting cannot be predicted how it will be stopped, which will depend on the expected outcome of the fighting, and the ability of Kiev and Moscow to continue in order to achieve their accepted goals, and since neither side is interested in this time in a diplomatic solution to the conflict, this war will not end anytime soon.
Under such circumstances, the position of the United States is considered one of the most important factors affecting the course of the war and its direction in the future. To shed light on America’s understanding of the nature of the balance of power on the ground, Washington’s position on current developments, and the likely scenarios that could develop in the coming weeks and months, Al Jazeera conducted the interview with Robert F. Pearson.
Pierson, whose research focuses on foreign and domestic policy in Russia and the former Soviet republics, has a forthcoming book, Russian Grand Strategy in the 21st Century.
Pierson holds a Ph.D. from Yale University, a master’s degree from Stanford University, and is a non-resident fellow at the Modern War Institute.
Here is the full text of the interview:
- After a year of fierce fighting, has Russia’s ‘attack’ on Ukraine achieved its purpose?
No, Russia has had to reduce its operational goals several times since the start of this war. Initially, he tried to quickly capture Kiev and overthrow the democratically elected government of Ukraine, and after that failed, he tried to seize and consolidate as much territory as possible in eastern and southern Ukraine.
Yes, the Russians made some progress in southern Ukraine, which allowed them to build a land bridge to the Crimean peninsula, but they suffered significant losses in the previously occupied areas around Kharkov, Zaporizhia and Kherson, making it an illegal annexation of Russia of these territories and fantasy. Russia now appears to have scaled back its ambitions to consolidate its control over all of Donetsk and Luhansk, although it has not yet fully captured them, as major offensive gains against Ukrainian forces across the contact line continue.
All this suggests that the “attack” did not achieve its goals, which became narrower and narrower as the war progressed.
- The “attack” did not serve its purpose, so do we expect Russia to be defeated in the war in Ukraine?
At this point, in my opinion, it would be defeating Russia for Ukraine to expel all Russian troops from its territory by force. And that means that a full withdrawal of Russian troops would not be part of a negotiated diplomatic solution, but could only be achieved on the battlefield with broad support and arms supplies from the West.
If Ukraine manages to push Russian forces out of its territory and regain control of its borders, Russia can end its military operations, or it can continue its prolonged firefight across fortified borders and neutral areas.
But either way, Russia’s hybrid political and information war against Ukraine will continue indefinitely, even after the fighting ends.
- If that were to happen, what would a Russian victory in the Ukraine war look like?
The Russian victory scenario begins when Western financial and military support for the Kiev government is significantly reduced, allowing Russia to make up for its recent losses. If Moscow manages to fully retake the regions of Ukraine it annexed last year, it could declare the war over and its willingness to negotiate a peaceful settlement. And this inevitably leads to international pressure to force Zelensky to sit at the negotiating table. At that time, he will be in a weak position and will be forced to accept the fact that Russia has annexed Ukrainian territory.
But no Ukrainian leader can agree to such terms, and therefore, a peace agreement will not be reached. In such a situation, there could be a “no war, no peace” situation, as in the case of the Korean peninsula, with a military border running through the center of Ukraine.
- When and how is the war in Ukraine expected to end?
The fighting could eventually end without a formal peace agreement being signed, or it could end without one.
Russia’s political, informational, social and economic war against Ukraine will continue. Even with the establishment of military borders and the declaration of a ceasefire, tensions will continue and violence will be occasional.
So the only difference between “victory for Ukraine” and “victory for Russia” is where those lines end up.
Although I’m sure that’s how battles usually end, nobody knows when that’s going to happen. Neither Russia nor Ukraine have given up their stated goals in this war, and neither side has yet exhausted themselves, so the fighting will continue and rage until that can be predicted.
- The war began against the background of talks about the need for “Ukraine to remain neutral,” and after almost a year of fighting, is this thought still alive?
In a way, the question became irrelevant in the first weeks of the war. Today, even true Ukrainian neutrality is not enough for Putin to end the war. In any case, Ukrainian neutrality is not fully present today. If Ukraine continues to exist as a sovereign, independent and free state, it will forever be aligned with the West and against Russia, for which this Russian war has been laid as a foundation. And if Russia succeeds in its original political goal of controlling the Ukrainian government as a puppet regime, then, in this case, Ukraine will not remain neutral.
- After almost a year of US support, what can the Biden administration do now to help Ukraine?
The spring of 2023 will be a critical period for Ukraine, when it is expected that it will face a new round of Russian aggression from the Donbas region, at the same time, I expect Ukraine to be ready to fight back in the spring. Ukraine must be able to absorb and mitigate Russian military offensives in the east of the country while maintaining sufficient strength to take advantage of counter-attack opportunities and strategic territorial gains whenever and wherever possible.
Such success will require the United States to provide more weapons than it has promised so far: more tanks, long-range missile systems, and fighter jets, for example. Timing will also be an issue, as Ukraine needs the weapons now and most assessments are that it will not receive enough for its next campaign in the near future. Therefore, the United States and its allies need to speed up and increase arms shipments to Ukraine before it is too late.
- Do you think Putin underestimated the Biden administration’s response to this move?
Yes. The extent of the strategic disaster that President Putin has created for Russia lies in his underestimation of Ukraine’s military capabilities and determination, as well as the determination of the United States to resist such an invasion. He also clearly underestimated the strength and unity of NATO, and he originally predicted that Europe’s energy dependence on Russia would drive a wedge between the United States and its European allies. Putin may have predicted that he would complete the invasion without strategic consequences, as he did when he invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea in 2014. But this time, Putin has seriously miscalculated on this point.
- What have been the main geostrategic consequences of the war so far?
I believe there were 3 important consequences: First, this disastrous and costly war in Russia accelerated the demographic and economic decline that already existed in Russia before the war. It will take decades for Russia to recover from this war.
And that leads to a second result: Russia’s poor performance and the decline mentioned above confirm that Russia is doomed in the 21st century to a secondary role that has been reduced to a second-class condition. Although Russia will continue to influence international politics, the competition, conflict and interaction between China and the United States will shape the international order in the next century. In short, international politics must be bipolar politics, not tripartite politics.
Third, China can only learn from this war in Ukraine. The United States has shown a firm determination to resist such a war, which may cause China to think twice about the Taiwan Strait issue.
- What do you think of Putin’s occasional threats to use nuclear weapons?
Although we cannot completely ignore such threats, I consider them tactics designed to scare the West and complicate further support for Ukraine. At this point, I do not believe they are a credible threat, and I still think the probability of a nuclear war in Ukraine is very low.
- What are the lessons for those trying to understand the nature of warfare today and in the future?
Despite the advent of precision weapons, advanced technology, and a host of kinetic and non-kinetic warfare tools, war remains a destructive phenomenon. Shockingly, the United States has lost nearly 7,000 soldiers and wounded another 50,000 in its 20-year war in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Although exact figures are hard to come by, it is estimated that Russia lost nearly 200,000 troops (killed or wounded) in just one year of engagement with Ukraine, while Ukrainian figures are likely of over 100,000 casualties.
The great power wars of the 20th century were the most destructive in human history, and no one should be under any illusion that the great power wars of the 21st century will be any different.
