“We [the U.S.] began as a sliver of a country and next thing you know we’re a continental power, and we did not do that primarily through our great diplomacy and our good looks and our charm. We did that primarily by taking the land from other people.”
That was Michael O’Hanlon, the Brookings InstitutionS Director of Research in the Foreign Policy program, speaking January 12, about his new book To Dare Mighty Things: U.S. Defense Strategy Since the Revolution,on a panel with retired-Gen. David Petraeus and Historian Robert Kagan.
O’hanlon continued, “Now, this is not a revisionist history that’s meant to beat up on the United states for having become a world power, because if we hadn’t done that, if we hadn’t become this continental power, then we could never have prevailed in the World Wars…The world would have been a much worse place and we could never have played the role we did in the Cold War and at least up until recent times, the post-Cold-War world.So generally speaking, I’m glad for this American assertiveness, but to me, its striking just how little we understand that about ourselves.”
Listening to that event eight days ago at Brookings, and looking around at what the Trump administration is doing at home and abroad today, I thought elements of what I heard from these three were worth repeating and reviewing.
For example, O’Hanlon pointed out a great amount of U.S. grand strategy and national security thinking took place during historic periods considered times of American isolationism and retrenchment.
O’hanlon said, “A lot of the institutional machinery, a lot of the intellectual and leadership development capability of the United States began in this period starting in the late 19th century and accelerating into the inner [World] War years [1918-to-1941]. And without that, we would not have had the great leaders like [Gen. Dwight D.] Eisenhower, and [Gen. George C.] Marshall, trained in the way they were. I think that made them ready for world War II.”
He added,”We would not have had many of the innovations that occurred in this period of time — so whether it’s [Rear Admiral William A.] Moffett and [Navy] air power and [aircraft] carrier power, [Army Brig. Gen.] Billy Mitchell and the development of the Army Air Corps, [Marine Maj. Gen. John A.] Lejeune and the thinking about amphibious warfare. A lot of these great military leaders and innovators were doing their thing in the early decades of the 20th century and including in the inner war years in ways that prepared us for all these new innovations, all these new kinds of operations that would prove so crucial in World War II.”
“To me it’s sort of striking,” O’Hanlon said, “how quickly we got momentum in World War II, given how underprepared we were in terms of standing armies and navies and capabilities. And by early 1943 at the latest, I think we’re basically starting to win that war, which is faster than we’ve frequently enough turned things around in many of our conflicts in our history.”
Kagan, a Brookings senior fellow and author of the 2012 book The World america Made,picked up on American assertiveness. “Ideologically, the United States was expansive,” Kagan said, “We had a universalist ideology. We got upset when we saw liberalism being attacked, even back in the 1820s. You know, a lot of Americans wanted to help the Greek rebellion [against the Ottoman Empire]. The world was very ideological in the 19th century and we saw ourselves as being on the side of liberalism and freedom versus genuine autocracies like Russia and Austria and Prussia. And so we always had these sympathies. Now everybody would say wait a second it’s none of our business blah blah blah blah, but nevertheless the general trend was we cared.”
Kagan went on, “People keep doing things out there that we’re finding offensive in one way or another. An
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the Motivations Behind the 2003 Invasion of Iraq
Table of Contents
The primary stated justification for the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies was the alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (wmds) by Saddam Hussein’s regime, though subsequent investigations revealed these claims to be inaccurate. While WMDs were the publicly presented rationale, some analyses suggest other motivations played a significant role in the decision to initiate military action.
Weapons of Mass Destruction Claims
The Bush administration asserted that Iraq possessed and was actively developing chemical, biological, and possibly nuclear weapons, posing an imminent threat to the united States and its allies. This claim was central to building public and international support for the invasion. however,the Iraq Survey Group,led by Charles Duelfer,concluded in its October 2004 report that Iraq had terminated its WMD programs in the early 1990s and had no active programs at the time of the invasion. CIA Report on Iraq’s WMD Programs
Despite the lack of evidence, the administration continued to emphasize the WMD threat in the lead-up to the war. Such as, in his State of the Union address on February 12, 2003, President Bush stated, “The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons and is rebuilding the infrastructure to make more.” President Bush’s 2003 State of the Union Address
Geopolitical Strategy and Regime Change
Beyond the WMD issue, some analysts argue that the Bush administration pursued regime change in Iraq as part of a broader geopolitical strategy to reshape the Middle East and secure U.S. interests in the region. This included establishing a democratic ally in a strategically important country and countering perceived threats from Iran and other regional actors.
the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), a neoconservative think tank, published a report in 2000 advocating for a more assertive U.S. foreign policy, including the removal of Saddam Hussein from power.Rebuilding America’s Defenses. While the direct influence of PNAC on policy decisions is debated, the report reflects a broader intellectual current within the administration that favored proactive intervention in the Middle East.
Furthermore, securing access to Iraq’s oil reserves was often cited as a potential, though officially downplayed, motivation. Iraq possesses the world’s fifth-largest proven oil reserves, estimated at 143.1 billion barrels as of january 1, 2023. U.S. Energy Facts administration – World Proven and Probable oil Reserves
Connection to the September 11th Attacks
The Bush administration initially attempted to link Saddam Hussein’s regime to the September 11th terrorist attacks, despite a lack of evidence establishing a direct connection. This association was used to bolster public support for military action against Iraq.
The 9/11 Commission Report, released in 2004, found no collaborative relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda. The 9/11 Commission Report. However, the administration continued to suggest a possible link, arguing that Saddam Hussein posed a threat by potentially providing support to terrorist groups in the future.
Current Status (as of January 23,2026)
The 2
